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mystification or transcendence, but to a shift to the self as the object of rep-
resentation.
Bersani rejects "humanistic criticism" with its "reparative nature of cultural
symbolisation" (p. 7) because it devalues historical experience, misreads art as
philosophy, reaffirms an authoritative tradition of powerful selfhood, and mis-
represents the process of cultural symbolization.
The textual choices and readings are intriguing, ranging from Proust jux-
taposed with Melanie Klein to Malraux's La Condition humaine to Thomas Pyn-
chon's Gravity's Rainbow. The method owes much to Derrida and de Man. The
shifts or moves of the text show a neutralization or negation of representation,
idealization, or transcendence or an actualization of these forms of redemption,
in spite of the supposed scepticism of the author. The latter is most evident in
the chapter, "Against Ulysses," in which Joyce, in contrast to Beckett, is seen as
reaffirming cultural memories and "the enormous power of sublimation in our
culture ... as the appeasement and even transcendence of anxiety" (p. 176).
Given Bersani's assumptions, an observant reader may come away with the
feeling that his canonic authors are Baudelaire, Nietzsche, Flaubert, Bataille,
Melville, and Pynchon, and the unfortunates are Proust, Joyce, Benjamin, and
Malraux. Bersani speaks of the "possibility of pursuing not an art of truth
divorced from experience, but of phenomena liberated from the obsession with
truth" (p. 26). This is what he values; readers who share his materialist scepticism
will admire his readings. Those who do not will be troubled by his failure to
address the far-ranging ontological and historical assumptions which govern
his criticism.
VanderbiltUniversityPatricia A. Ward
Delicate Subjects: Romanticism, Gender, and the Ethics of
Understanding, by Julie Ellison; xv & 306 pp. Ithaca: Cor-
nell University Press, 1992, $16.95, paper.
We are stiU trying to sort out the complex legacy of romanticism. "We" here
includes phUosophers Stanley Cavell and Richard Rorty, feminist critics Sandra
GUbert and Susan Gubar, and a remarkable variety of literary theorists, from
Northrop Frye, M. H. Abrams, Paul de Man, and Harold Bloom through
Hazard Adams and Jerome J. McGann. Julie Ellison's important book, Delicate
Subjects, focuses on an especially difficult problem we have inherited from the
romantics: the problem of defining the ethics of interpretation. According to
Ellison, male romantic writers worry that in literary interpretation, we murder
to dissect (to paraphrase Wordsworth). Criticism, from this point of view, has
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troubling affinities with such masculinist values as aggression, violence, pos-
session, penetration, and mastery. Unwilling to see themselves as ruthless Ahabs
ripping out the hidden meaning of innocent texts, the romantics privilege
moments of nonexploitative understanding, moments associated with values
culturally encoded as feminine: receptivity, love, friendship, conversation, and
empathy. But even as the romantics appreciate these values, they still see the
need to justify criticism as manly, hard intellectual work, distinct from the
irresponsible gossip and sensationalistic novels that they often align with women.
With intelligence and care, Ellison explores how the romantics struggle to
distance themselves from masculinist aggression without succumbing to what
they see as the opposite effeminate extreme.
Her three well-chosen examples of romanticism are Friedrich Schleier-
macher, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and Margaret Fuller. Schleiermacher en-
forces the linkage between understanding and the "divinatory" or intuitive
knowledge of women. Although divination is valuable for Schleiermacher, he
cannot allow it to be sufficient. Feminine receptivity needs to be tempered by
method and systematic analysis. In a fine account of Coleridge's shifting career
(from the early poetry through the Biographia, TL· Friend, and the later writings),
Ellison shows how he sees the influence of women as an antidote to political
conflict and divisive ideological rhetoric, while nevertheless wishing to present
himself as a forceful critic—a man with a peaceable manner but still a man.
Coleridge tries "to develop a philosophical identity based on nonviolence or,
to be more precise, reluctant violence"(p. 1 58). Neither a gothic novelist catering
to women nor a Jacobin terrorist riding roughshod over them, Coleridge thinks
he has "the ability to speak as the defender of the home and of the purity of
women—even, occasionally, to speak as a suffering woman—and yet, insistently,
to be unlike them" (p. 186). In discussing Fuller, Ellison's main point is that
she remains a romantic—even in her feminist Woman in tL· Nineteenth Century
and in her realist, politically charged writings from Italy. Fuller grapples with
some quintessentially romantic problems: for example, conserving "the imag-
inative energy of the self" (p. 242) while responding to the justifiable demands
of friends and society (in Fuller's case, these demands include the imperatives
of feminist politics) and relating her writing to the political and military actions
she witnesses in Italy.
These analyses of Schleiermâcher, Coleridge, and Fuller are insightful and
thorough. The larger implications of the book, however, remain unclear, pardy
because ofsome compositional problems. There are not enough cross references
linking the readings of Ellison's three exemplary romantics; explicating their
writing sometimes gets the better of using it to advance a larger point; and the
book lacks a conclusion. Ellison's own vantage point is consequendy unclear.
She notes, for example, that "the irony of some feminist discourse, including
that of [Luce] Irigaray, is that the collectively projected morality of the speech
community is available as a feminist ideal arising in part from a forgotten
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masculine romanticism" (p. 20; see also p. 99). I am not sure what she makes
of this irony—whether it incapacitates feminism or rehabilitates romanticism.
Although key points remain undeveloped, Ellison is on the right track. As
she points out, "feminist theory has exhibited sustained dislike for the romantic"
(p. 11). Delicate Subjects adumbrates a more thoughtful response to romantic
tiieory. Ellison righdy encourages us to draw on romanticism in addressing
current issues in feminist theory, especially the vexed relationship between
ideology and subjectivity, political action and imaginative writing. Delicate Subjects
lays the groundwork for "a differendy modulated feminism" (p. 225), one that
sees romanticism as a resource rather than an encumbrance.
University of NewMexicoMichael Fischer
Nietzsche and Emerson: An Elective Affinity, by George J.
Stack; xi & 379 pp. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1992,
$39.95.
In a fine 1980 essay, John McDermott, speculating on Emerson's under-
appreciated influence on American philosophy, noted the curious situation of
Emerson studies: "In the vast secondary literature on Emerson distinctively
philosophical considerations are virtually absent." The only thing wrong with
that perceptive remark was its relegation to a footnote. For any reconsideration
of Emerson's thought must begin with his uniquely problematic reception-
history.
Why have critics, academic and nonacademic, persistendy for over a century
and a half, lifted Emerson to unquestioned canonical status—all the while
dismissing his work as unworthy of serious attention as either philosophy or
even as coherent prose? John Dewey was one of the first to object to this pattern;
Stanley Cavell has been objecting again. The prevailing "condescension" to
Emerson, Cavell insists, "helps to keep our culture, unlike any other in the
West, from possessing any founding thinker as a common basis for consider-
ations." Such condescension has now become an ingrained, largely unconscious
part of Emerson scholarship—and one needs some understanding of tins fact
to appreciate the importance of Stack's careful, idea by idea, placing of Emer-
son's work in an American-European phUosophical tradition that includes
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Freud.
The ramifications of this relocating of Emerson are enormous. If Stack is
right (as I believe he is)—if that radical, immensely influential philosophy/
psychology we call "Nietzschean" must now be rechristened "Emersonian," so
